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Chapter 4
Changes in wage policy and collective 
bargaining in the Nordic countries – comparison 
of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Søren Kaj Andersen, Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Kristin Alsos, Kristine Nergaard, 
Pekka Sauramo
1. Introduction
The policy responses of the European Union to the fi nancial and eco-
nomic crisis have brought wage-setting mechanisms within the sphere 
of the EU’s economic governance regime. Even though these monitoring 
processes and, in some cases, recommendations have had an impact on 
collective bargaining processes in some EU states, the Nordic collective 
bargaining systems have remained relatively unaffected by the European 
initiatives. 
One key explanation for the absence of reactions on the part of the 
Nordic wage-setting systems appears to be the fact that wage mod-
eration and the strengthening of competitiveness have been high on the 
agenda in these countries for the past two decades. One repercussion of 
economic crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s was not destabilisation or 
deterioration, but rather reform of the collective bargaining systems in 
the Nordic states. Among other things this meant steps towards decen-
tralised wage setting and therefore room for negotiations on wage setting 
at company level. This did not happen in a uniform way, but at different 
paces and with various consequences in the Nordic states. However, one 
shared characteristic is that decentralised bargaining takes place within 
a coordinated framework. In other words, national collective agreements 
concluded at sectoral level set the framework for company-level negotia-
tions. In a sense it can be argued that competitiveness was enhanced 
by collective bargaining based on the relatively pragmatic positions 
of dominant trade unions and employers’ associations. It is not that 
confl icts and power struggles were absent, rather there was – despite 
some uncertainties in, for example, Sweden– a basic willingness to try 
to develop the collective bargaining systems. 
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The Nordic states are all small, open economies with well-developed 
welfare states. Their labour markets are characterised by high incomes 
and high taxes, and manufacturing fi rms compete on innovation, com-
petence and, with some variations, natural resources. Denmark has been 
a member of the European Union since 1972, while Finland and Sweden 
joined in 1995. Norway has taken part in the single market since 1994 
through the EEA Agreement. All the countries have a substantial pub-
lic sector. The collective bargaining systems are based on strong social 
partners and a centralised bargaining system, with various degrees of 
decentralisation. 
The fi nancial crisis has had diverse effects in the Nordic countries; the 
oil-based Norwegian economy remained virtually unaffected; Denmark 
was relatively hard hit due to a self-infl icted real estate bubble; while 
Sweden and Finland fared somewhere in between (Andersen et al. 2014). 
Despite these differences it can be argued that the crisis has emphasised 
that European integration does put a strain on Nordic bargaining sys-
tems and, to a large degree, also sets the limits for wage development. 
The strains on bargaining systems have to do with the deepening of the 
single market in the enlarged EU, in which domestic-market oriented 
sectors, such as construction and private services, have faced competi-
tion from migrant labour and service providers from central and eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, it seems evident that German wage trends have 
had a signifi cant impact on national debates in the Nordic countries on 
the potential room for wage – or cost – increases. There is a relatively 
strong lobby, especially among employers’ representatives, that there is 
‘a need to follow the German economy’ in order to remain competitive 
and thereby safeguard the profi tability of companies and jobs. We there-
fore raise the question of how and to what degree we should see German 
wage ‘leadership’ as decisive for wage development in the individual 
Nordic states.
Accordingly, in this chapter we review and compare wage policy and col-
lective bargaining in the Nordic countries. Specifi cally, we do the fol-
lowing. First, explain how in recent decades collective bargaining and 
wage determination systems have been reformed in the Nordic countries 
with a view to securing competitiveness and job creation. Second, show 
how economic integration of European markets – and more specifi cally 
the so-called new economic governance regime of the European Union 
– have had limited direct effects on Nordic bargaining systems, while 
there might be more indirect effects, such as German wage leadership. 
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Therefore we discuss the infl uence of German wage and cost trends in 
Denmark, Finland and Norway. We also address the effects of labour 
migration and the presence of foreign service providers in, for example, 
construction and private services. In the concluding section we summa-
rise the fi ndings and discuss future trends regarding Nordic wage bar-
gaining. 
2. Changes in collective bargaining structures
The Nordic collective bargaining systems went through quite signifi cant 
changes in the 1980s and 1990s against the background of economic 
problems. First, there was a need to overcome wage infl ation and to ad-
just wage formation to the international shift to low-infl ation economies. 
Second, employers demanded more fl exibility in collective agreements. 
Increasing competition, shifting markets, new technology and new 
forms of work organisation resulted in these demands from employers 
and politicians for more fl exible labour market regulation. 
The Nordic economies fared very well through the 1990s and in the early 
2000s; this included increased levels of employment and very low lev-
els of unemployment, modest but stable real wage growth and balanced 
public budgets. The reforms of the Nordic collective bargaining systems 
must be seen as inherent to the relative success – economically and job-
wise – of the Nordic states (Andersen et al. 2014; Dølvik et al. 2014; 
Dølvik 2009). 
It is important to emphasise that, in contrast to other countries, where 
the coordination of negotiations broke down and collective agreements 
were entirely replaced by workplace human resource management – for 
example, the United Kingdom – the Nordic countries have maintained 
a high level of coordination concomitantly with considerable decentrali-
sation, particularly in Denmark and Sweden. This process has been re-
ferred to as ‘centralised decentralisation’ (Due et al. 1993) or ‘organised 
decentralisation’ (Traxler 1995). This section describes the respective 
national solutions to the tension between decentralisation/fl exibility 
and coordination, as well as their signifi cance for the development of 
collective bargaining processes and outcomes. 
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2.1 Denmark: centralised decentralisation
Since the 1980s, negotiations in Denmark have taken place at the branch 
level with multiple-employer agreements that set wages and working 
conditions within a specifi c trade or profession or economic area. The 
confederations LO and DA coordinate negotiations in the private labour 
market, but are not parties to the agreements. Since the major confl ict 
of 1998 in particular, the confederations have taken it upon themselves 
to ensure tightly coordinated bargaining in order to avoid confl icts (Due 
and Madsen 2006). This is achieved by means of so-called ‘climate 
agreements’ or road maps that establish the timetable for negotiations, 
common notifi cation concerning confl icts and joint statements in rela-
tion to bargaining results in order to avoid any doubt about the bargain-
ing results. 
Bargaining is spearheaded by the parties of the manufacturing agree-
ments for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Here, a framework for 
wage and labour cost increases in general is negotiated as part of the 
agreements, which then sets the pattern for the other bargaining areas. 
This principle has been in force since the beginning of the 1990s and 
there has only been a single instance – in 1995 – where other areas have 
reached a collective agreement fi rst. This ensures coordination in the 
private sector – and because of the regulation device, which stipulates 
that if public sector wage increases differ from those in the private sec-
tor, 80 per cent of that difference will be adjusted positively or 100 per 
cent of the difference will be adjusted negatively, as the case may be. This 
ensures that wage developments in the two sectors are parallel. One of 
the main reasons for strong coordination has been the centralisation of 
the employers over the past three decades, the number of associations in 
DA having fallen from 150 to 13. On the trade union side, centralisation 
has also been reinforced, as the LO associations in manufacturing have 
developed the bargaining cartel CO-industry. Other branches have also 
developed negotiation cartels, but they are not parties to agreements. 
The mediation institution (forligsinstitutionen) plays a key role in the 
Danish bargaining systems (Galenson 1955). If negotiations at branch 
level do not result in renewed agreements, the mediation institution 
convenes for mediation. If the parties are not able to reach a settlement, 
the agreement is transferred to a so-called linkage procedure (sammen-
kædning), which is based on the fi nal negotiations between LO and DA 
in which the mediator is involved. Here, the non-renewed agreements 
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are linked and made part of a total settlement proposal, which is then 
sent to the parties for their approval. The mediation proposal will only 
be made if none of the parties objects. In other words, LO and DA can 
oppose proposals that are not in line with what manufacturing has re-
ceived (Ibsen 2013). Additionally, the trade union ballots must produce 
a qualifi ed majority in order to reject the proposed renewal. This means 
that the linkage procedure ensures a high degree of coordination. 
Within the DA area, 80–85 per cent of employees now have minimum 
wage agreements with local wage bargaining, and some even have fi g-
ureless agreements without wage provisions, whereas 15–20 per cent 
have so-called normal wage agreements, where wages are set at the 
sectoral level (DA 2013). The content of bargaining coordination has 
thus changed in tandem with the decentralisation of wages and working 
hours to the workplace level. In the public sector, the scope for local bar-
gaining is still negotiated as part of central collective bargaining agree-
ments, and the implementation of decentralised wage setting can often 
be modest in relation to the collective agreement pay scale. In return for 
the decentralisation of wages and working hours, the Danish trade un-
ions in the private sector have developed a number of social benefi ts in 
the branch agreements. This applies to the occupational labour market 
pension since the late 1980s and early 1990s, maternity leave benefi ts 
in 2004, continued education in 2007, the so-called free-choice account 
(fritvalgskontoen1) in 2007 and the severance pay arrangement reached 
in 2010. Most of these benefi ts are also found in the public sector. 
2.2 Finland: centralised incomes policy
Among the Nordic countries Finland has a lengthy history of incomes 
policy, based on centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements. They 
have resulted from tripartite cooperation between employees’ and em-
ployers’ central confederations and the government. Between 1968 and 
2013 twenty-two centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements were 
concluded, while in eleven cases wage agreements were at sectoral level. 
As regards wage policy, Finland therefore represents continuity rather 
than change. This does not mean, however, that nothing has changed. 
1. ‘Fritvalgskontoen’ is an individual account, where part of the wage or salary is deposited and 
can later be withdrawn either in the form of extra pension, extra paid vacation or wages. 
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Demands for reforming the bargaining system have increased, especially 
during the past twenty years. Among the participants in tripartite co-
operation, employers’ associations have been most active in question-
ing the benefi ts of centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements. In 
2007 the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), the employers’ cen-
tral confederation, declared that it would cease to negotiate wages at the 
central level. The announcement was followed by two wage negotiation 
rounds which resulted in sectoral agreements, but since then two cen-
trally negotiated framework agreements have been concluded. 
After the 2007 announcement by EK the revitalisation of incomes policy 
has been somewhat surprising. It can be explained by special circum-
stances, however. In diffi cult times centrally negotiated incomes policy 
agreements have been used as the means of concluding very moderate 
wage increases. In the incomes policy agreement concluded in 1991 wage 
increases were frozen for two years. The latest incomes policy agree-
ment, concluded in October 2013 – that is, in the middle of a recession 
of the Finnish economy – is also based on very moderate wage increases. 
During the past twenty years, centralised incomes policy agreements 
have been proof of consensual behaviour on the part of the peak labour 
market confederations and the government.
Besides special circumstances some peculiarities in Finnish corporatism 
may provide an additional explanation for the continuity of centralised 
incomes policy. In Finland employees’ and employers’ central confeder-
ations have traditionally had a very strong position not only in the arena 
of industrial relations but also in the political system. This has mainly 
been due to the lack of strong ‘friendly’ left-wing and bourgeois parties 
which would have represented employers’ and employees’ interests in 
the political system. For example, in comparison with the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party, the Finnish Social Democratic Party has traditionally 
been much weaker. Nor has there been a strong bourgeois party which 
would have represented employers’ interests. The peak confederations 
have therefore had a strong incentive to enter into the political arena as 
political actors. 
This history provides one reason for the comprehensiveness of the cen-
trally negotiated incomes policy agreements in Finland. In addition to 
agreements on wages and salaries, comprehensive incomes policy agree-
ments have included important social policy reforms and other policy 
issues (Kiander et al. 2011). They have involved, for example, major 
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changes in earnings-related social security and in transfer payments 
in general. In comparison, for example, with Sweden the role of labour 
market confederations as active actors in the political arena has been 
very different in Finland (Kiander et al. 2011).
During the past twenty years, the importance of local bargaining has 
increased, but not at the cost of centrally negotiated comprehensive 
incomes policy agreements. Decentralisation has been organised and 
complementary to higher-level bargaining. It has taken place such that 
higher-order collective agreements constitute benchmarks for local bar-
gaining (Sippola 2012). The role of higher-order agreements have been 
crucial and, for example, the use of opening clauses has been exception-
al. In addition, the high bargaining coverage has increased the impor-
tance of collective agreements in wage formation. It has been one factor 
behind the high level of bargaining coordination. 
The Finnish way of putting decentralisation into practise refl ects the tra-
ditionally strong position of trade unions at local level. It has been ac-
companied by high union membership. Furthermore, trade unions have 
been central actors both in company bargaining and codetermination 
activities. Codetermination has been trade union-based. 
2.3  Norway: tripartite cooperation and reinforcing the 
frontrunner model 
The Norwegian collective bargaining system has never decentralised to 
the same degree as the Danish and Swedish ones. Except for parts of the 
1980s, incomes policy and coordinating measures by the social partners 
at peak level have been key elements of the wage-setting model. Whereas 
the early and mid-1990s were marked by relatively extensive incomes 
policy measures combined with moderate wage increases – triggered by 
an economic downturn (Solidarity Alternative) – the end of the 1990s 
was characterised by high wage increases compared with Norway’s trad-
ing partners, high wage drift and tensions within the bargaining system 
as public employees felt that their wages were lagging behind the private 
sector. This led to renewed focus on the wage-setting mechanisms.
In 2000 and 2003, state appointed committees with representatives 
from all the major trade unions and employer organisations confi rmed 
the relevance of and support for the so-called ‘trendsetting industries 
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model’. The theory behind the model was fi rst published in the 1960s 
and later formulated as a macroeconomic two-sector model for wage set-
ting and infl ation in small open economies (Aukrust 1977). In Norway 
the rationale has been that the framework for wage increases is given 
by price increases in international export markets and productivity in-
creases in export industries. In addition, currency rates infl uence the 
competitiveness of the export industries and the monetary regime – and 
changes in it – is an important factor in the model. Since 2001 the cen-
tral bank (Norges Bank) has pursued a monetary policy aimed at a stable 
infl ation rate. 
Multi-employer bargaining at peak and industry level is the dominant 
model of collective bargaining, often supplemented by bargaining at 
workplace level. The running period for collective agreements is two 
years, although wage rates are renegotiated after one year. The pay 
rounds always start out with the export industries if agreements are re-
negotiated separately, or with all the LO/NHO agreements if negotia-
tions are conducted at peak level. No agreements will be signed before a 
settlement is reached for the trend-setting industries. Cross-sector rene-
gotiations at confederation level were originally seen as a main charac-
teristic of the collective bargaining model. However, since 2000 only two 
of eight main renegotiations have taken place between the main confed-
erations. So, over the past decade other types of coordination have domi-
nated, such as coordination between employer associations and within 
the main trade union confederation, LO. 
In the public sector, blue-collar and white-collar workers are covered by 
the same agreements, and negotiations are undertaken by bargaining 
cartels within the labour confederations. The implication is that all trade 
union confederations will end up with the same agreement. However, 
the wage structure of academic positions is more decentralised than 
other positions in collective agreements covering municipal employees. 
The Norwegian system of bargaining and incomes policies is anchored 
in tripartite committees and state-supported mediation. The trade 
union and employers’ confederations, the state and Statistics Norway 
all participate in the TBU committee (Teknisk beregningsutvalg). The 
committee publishes detailed wage fi gures, including carry-over effects 
and wage drift for the main bargaining areas, as well as developments 
in labour costs among Norway’s most important trading partners. In 
this way the committee contributes to a common understanding of the 
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economic situation among the social partners. The National Mediator 
plays an important role in facilitating new agreements and will normally 
follow the main framework given by the trend-setting industries agree-
ment in its proposals. In cases in which industrial action is ended by 
compulsory arbitration, the National Wage Board will normally look to 
the trend-setting industries agreement in order to discourage breaka-
ways. Lastly, the state has contributed to moderate settlements through 
incomes policy. Although less pronounced over recent decades com-
pared with the 1970s and late 1980s/early 1990s, it is not uncommon 
that social reforms or labour market measures are introduced through 
collective bargaining. 
2.4 Sweden: coordinated decentralisation
Lack of coordination in Swedish wage bargaining in the 1980s and the 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, spurred the Swedish gov-
ernment to step in. First, with a failed attempt at incomes policy, there-
after with the Rehnberg Commission, which assisted the parties with 
mediation and coordination in order to restore wage restraint across 
branches and sectors in line with wage developments abroad (the so-
called ‘Edin norm’) (Elvander 2002). The Commission was a success 
from 1991, but coordination broke down in 1995, when bargaining was 
plagued by confl ict and led to higher wage increases than abroad, despite 
high unemployment and continued economic problems. 
In the wake of the 1995 breakdown, the manufacturing trade unions 
across LO, TCO and SACO invited their employer counterparts in 1996 
to draft a new bargaining arrangement based on wage restraint, syn-
chronised negotiations and a strong mediation institution. This resulted 
in the Industry Agreement (Industriavtalet) of 1997, which fi rmly es-
tablished the new principles of the Swedish collective bargaining system 
(Elvander 2002). 
First, competitiveness was to be restored by means of reasonable wage 
development in line with developments among trade partners abroad. 
Second, the negotiations were to be synchronised with consideration of 
the expiration date and length of the collective bargaining agreements 
in order to avoid wage spirals. Third, impartial mediators (opartiska 
ordföranda) were entrusted with helping the parties reach agreement 
and ensuring coordination across the collective agreements in manu-
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facturing. Coordination between the manufacturing partners was also 
strengthened by the establishment of the Swedish Unions within Manu-
facturing (Facken inom Industrin). The employers in manufacturing in-
dustry also increased their coordination, in which Teknikföretagen (pre-
viously, Verkstadsföreningan) assumed the most important role (Ibsen 
2013). 
Agreements regarding cooperation and negotiations were also es-
tablished in other branches in the wake of the Industry Agreement. 
Moreover, the state established the Swedish National Mediation Of-
fi ce (Medlingsinstitutet) in 2000, which includes obligatory mediation 
for parties when they are unable to reach agreement and when they do 
not have their own bargaining agreement with built-in mediation. The 
Swedish National Mediation Offi ce was entrusted with ensuring labour 
peace and socio-economically defensible wage development based on 
the pattern-setting manufacturing agreements. This means that the me-
diators will never present a settlement proposal that exceeds the manu-
facturing pattern, even in the event that the employers might be willing 
to accept. This is to ensure wage restraint in the mediation procedure 
(Ibsen 2013). 
Since decentralisation from central to branch and sectoral levels, the 
new Swedish collective bargaining system has increased coordination 
signifi cantly, while also more agreements have now become framework 
agreements with regard to wages and working hours. In the private 
sector, 83 per cent of the agreements include local wage formation, 
whereas 17 per cent pertain to central wage determination (Medlingsin-
stitutet 2013). However, the collective agreements in the private sector 
still include minimum guarantees and clauses guaranteeing wage in-
creases in the local and individual negotiations – also for civil servants 
(tjenestemænd) and academic groups. Wages are set locally to a much 
higher degree in the public sector. Issues such as continued training, 
however, have not become widespread in collective agreements (Ibsen 
2013).
To conclude this short review of changes to collective bargaining struc-
tures, it seems fair to claim that the Nordic countries have maintained 
a high level of coordination together with much decentralisation de-
spite national variations. Moreover, the export-oriented industries – 
especially manufacturing – were the driving force behind institutional 
changes in the late 1980s and up through the 1990s. Increased interna-
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tional competition and new production methods in the 1980s seem to 
have motivated employers, but in contrast to other European countries, 
reforms did not erode comprehensive bargaining. This does not, how-
ever, mean that the bargaining systems are free from both internal and 
external challenges. It is to some of the most salient challenges that we 
now turn. 
3. European economic integration and challenges facing 
the Nordic bargaining systems
Even though the Nordic collective bargaining systems have been re-
formed in recent decades and thereby have been adapted to more inten-
sifi ed cross-border competition it does not mean that Nordic wage bar-
gaining has remained unaffected by the EU’s new economic governance. 
The direct effects of new European policy initiatives might have been 
limited, but other more indirect effects or consequences of European po-
litical and economic integration are present. This concerns strains on the 
bargaining systems due to the deepening of the single market in the en-
larged EU, where domestic market–oriented sectors, such as construc-
tion and private services, face competition from migrant labour and ser-
vice providers from central and eastern Europe. Furthermore, German 
wage trends have an impact on national debates in the Nordic countries 
on the potential room for wage – or labour cost – increases. Nordic wage 
trends are particularly affected by European trends via trade dependence 
on the German economy. This is not new, but the need to remain com-
petitive and therefore also to keep wage and cost increases on a par with 
the most important trading partners – Germany – has been reinforced 
since the fi nancial crisis. The relative success of the German economy in 
recent years has enhanced its position, creating what could be termed 
a discourse about the ‘need to follow the German economy in order to 
secure balanced budgets and competitiveness’. In the following we raise 
the question of how and to what degree we should see German wage 
leadership as decisive for wage development in, respectively, Denmark, 
Finland and Norway. But before focussing on German infl uence on wage 
bargaining we turn briefl y to the strain on wages and wage regulation 
caused by competition from migrant labour and service providers from 
central and eastern Europe. 
3.1 Labour migration – potential eff ects on wage levels and 
bargaining systems 
The expansion of the EU/EEA labour market has led to a strong infl ux of 
labour migrants and service providers from central and eastern Europe 
(CEE) into the Nordic countries. The volume of migration from those 
countries has varied over time. While Denmark and Sweden were the top 
destinations before 2004, Norway has received an increasing share since 
the 2004 enlargement. In 2006 Norway became the top receiving coun-
try with almost half of all the migrants from CEE countries to the Nordic 
region in 2011. The Finnish share decreased from 2004 to 2008, but 
has increased again since then (Tronstad and Joona 2013). In the years 
2003 to 2011, 335 000 citizens from the new EU countries moved to the 
Nordic countries. In addition, a large number were working temporarily 
in the Nordic countries, for instance as workers posted by foreign service 
providers. It has been estimated that this group in Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark made up about 40 per cent of workers from CEE countries (El-
dring and Friberg 2013; Friberg and Eldring 2013). The use of migrant 
workers has been particularly high in construction, manufacturing and 
the low-skilled parts of private services. 
Labour migration has satisfi ed a great demand for labour in the Nor-
dic countries. This has benefi tted the economy, but has also implied 
challenges for the system of collective bargaining and wage coordina-
tion. Due to large pay differences between CEE countries and the Nor-
dic countries, migrant workers often accept or might be compelled to 
accept wages that are lower than those prevailing in the Nordic labour 
markets (Friberg et al. 2013). None of the Nordic countries have a na-
tional statutory minimum wage. In Finland and Iceland the minimum 
wage fl oor is secured by generally applicable collective agreements. This 
is also the case for a few industries in Norway, such as construction, 
shipyards, cleaning and the green sector. Sweden and Denmark, as well 
as the majority of Norwegian industries rely on collective agreements 
alone to secure a minimum wage fl oor. Foreign service providers are less 
likely to be bound by collective agreements and can in such cases offer 
lower wages and worse working conditions to their employees, thereby 
reducing costs and enhancing their competitiveness. The same may ap-
ply to unorganised domestic fi rms (unbound by collective agreements) 
that rely on hiring cheap migrant labour, either directly or through sub-
contractors.
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Decreasing union density and collective bargaining coverage in com-
bination with a large supply of low-wage employees can make it more 
tempting also for domestic employers to opt out of collective agree-
ments, thus leading to a downward spiral. General application of collec-
tive agreements can to some extent counteract this effect. The Finnish 
system, however, is dependent on collective agreements to cover close 
to half of the workers by being made generally applicable (Seip 2010). 
In Norway it is essentially only the minimum wages of collective agree-
ments that are made generally binding. An increase in the proportion of 
enterprises and workers standing outside organisations and agreements, 
could, everything else being equal, affect the competitive situation be-
tween organised versus unorganised fi rms and workers and thereby 
weaken the organised actors’ infl uence and membership base (Andersen 
et al. 2014). A growing share of unorganised workers reduces the negoti-
ating power of trade unions and can alter the balance between employers 
and employees and accordingly affect wage trends. The Nordic countries 
may also face greater disparities between groups of employers, with low 
skilled workers receiving less and high skilled workers more than they 
would have in a more coordinated wage policy regime. Analyses from the 
Norwegian construction industry show that labour migration has had a 
negative effect on wages for domestic workers, partly due to substitution 
effects, but that extension of collective agreements may counteract this 
(Bratsberg et al. 2013; Holden 2014). 
Table 1 Mechanisms for determining wages in the Nordic countries
Coverage of collec-
tive agreements in the 
private sector*
Extension of 
collective 
agreements
Regime
Denmark 74% No Autonomous collective 
bargaining model
Sweden 85% No Autonomous collective 
bargaining model
Norway 50% Yes, some since 2004 Mixed model
Finland 85% Yes, widespread Statutory regulations (and 
strong unions) 
Iceland 95% Yes, widespread Statutory regulations (and 
strong unions)
Note: *Numbers from Finland and Iceland include employees covered by generally applicable collec-
tive agreements. In Finland bargaining coverage excluding generally applicable agreements was 73 
per cent in 2008 (Ahtiainen 2011). Source: Alsos and Eldring 2014. 
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3.2 Inﬂ uence of the new European economic governance on the 
collective bargaining systems of the four Nordic countries
As members of the EU, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been poten-
tial objects of the new political interventionism exercised by the EU. In 
the fi eld of collective bargaining, the major instruments of wage policy 
intervention have been Country-specifi c Recommendations (CSRs) issued 
within the context of the European Semester. CSRs could have been re-
lated to wages and wage-policy institutions. The recommendations are 
prepared by the European Commission, but their fi nal adoption is carried 
out by national leaders in the European Council. Accordingly, the rec-
ommendations prepared by the Commission might be approved by the 
Council only after some modifi cation. In addition to CSRs, the European 
Commission can produce, for example in Alert Mechanism Reports and 
in-depth reviews, commentaries on wages and wage-policy institutions. 
Among the three Nordic EU countries, only Finland and Sweden received 
wage-related recommendations from the European Commission during 
2012–2014. Finland obtained two, one in 2012 and one in 2013. In both 
of them, wage restraint, or the alignment of real wages and productivity 
developments, was recommended. The reason for these recommenda-
tions was primarily that Finland within the alert mechanism had exceed-
ed the threshold of increases in unit labour costs. In the in-depth review 
for 2012 ‘rigidities in the wage settlement process’ are regarded as causes 
of the signifi cant rise in unit labour costs (European Commission 2012c: 
2). The recommendations, which are not binding, had no infl uence on 
Finnish policy discussions. Nor was the tone of the recommendations 
demanding. The Commission’s recommendation on Finland’s 2013 
national reform programme advised that Finland should take action 
to ‘support the alignment of real wage and productivity developments 
whilst fully respecting the role of social partners and in line with national 
practices’ (European Commission 2013: 6). Any recommendations that 
might concern the Finnish system of multi-employer bargaining have 
not been put forward. However, there is a comment on wage dispersion 
which can be interpreted as being about the Finnish bargaining system: 
in the in-depth review for 2014 compressed wage distribution is regard-
ed as a cause of high prices, eroding both domestic welfare and external 
competitiveness (European Commission 2014a: 51).
Sweden received one wage-related recommendation from the Commis-
sion (in 2012). It refl ects one of the main objectives of EU policies; the 
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desire to increase downward fl exibility of wages. The European Com-
mission recommends that Sweden should ‘take further measures to im-
prove the labour market participation of youth and vulnerable groups 
by focusing on effective active labour market policy measures, encour-
aging increased wage fl exibility, notably at the lower end of the wage 
scale’ (European Commission 2012d: 5). Sweden is a country with both 
a highly compressed wage structure and, accordingly, a very small low-
wage sector. The recommendation was aimed at enlarging the low-wage 
sector. Overall, in the Commission’s view Sweden is among the most 
competitive EU countries, which explains the absence of comments and 
recommendations related to cost competitiveness. 
Denmark has not received wage-related CSRs from the Commission, but 
in some commentaries the Commission has paid attention to the dete-
rioration of price competitiveness which, it said, was due to high nomi-
nal wage increases in the period of overheating and weak productivity 
growth in the years leading up to the fi nancial crisis (European Commis-
sion 2012a: 14; 2012b: 8). Unit labour costs have since decreased. On 
the whole, in comparison with the crisis countries, the new European 
interventionism has so far not had a notable infl uence on collective bar-
gaining in the three Nordic EU countries. 
4. German impact on Nordic wage bargaining 
Germany’s success in job creation since the fi nancial crisis and the fact 
that wage increases there were modest in the years leading up to it have 
affected debates on wage development in the Nordic countries. Looking 
at wage development, all the Nordic countries experienced a relatively 
high wage growth from 2000 to 2013, whereas German relative wag-
es decreased (see fi gures in chapter 2). The country differences within 
manufacturing are smaller, but still we see clear differences in relative 
wage developments. In this section we will discuss the infl uence of Ger-
man wage policy in Denmark, Norway and Finland in recent years.
4.1 Denmark: inﬂ uence of new economic governance and 
German wage policy 
Although Denmark is not part of the EMU, the government (in offi ce 
since 2011) has nevertheless committed itself to the convergence criteria 
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and carefully sought to restore trust in Danish fi nances. It has done so 
by restoring balanced public budgets and pursuing a reform programme 
designed to increase labour supply and labour productivity. This is in 
line with the Commission’s recommendations to Denmark on preserving 
a sound fi scal position (European Commission 2014b). Moreover, cen-
tral tight control on public spending and sanctions for over-spending in 
local government meant that municipalities have underspent during the 
crisis with a knock-on depressing effect on fi scal stimulus from these im-
portant public sources (Pedersen and Andersen 2014). Critics – among 
them trade union economists – have therefore remarked that the strict 
Danish adherence to the EMU-criteria is dampening growth and the reli-
ance on export-led job-growth might be too one-sided.  Indeed, Danish 
exports are healthy but have not produced the expected job-rebound.
With regard to the Danish wage bargaining system, the EU has not – as 
shown above – made any recommendations of reform. As noted in the 
previous section, Danish wage-setting was gradually transformed dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s to become quite fl exible while keeping a high 
degree of coordination – what has been called ‘centralised decentralisa-
tion’ (Due et al. 1993). At the onset of the crisis in 2008, the social part-
ners were quick to agree on the real economic consequences for the open 
Danish economy. As thousands of jobs were shed, the pattern-setting 
social partners in manufacturing agreed very modest wage increases in 
2010 and 2012, but the real changes happened on the shop-fl oor with 
wage freezes or sometimes wage cuts in company level bargaining. This 
was possible due to the fl exible wage-systems in most private sector 
companies. 
According to Danish Industry – the largest employer federation – be-
tween a quarter and a third of employees in manufacturing accepted a 
wage freeze in local wage bargaining, setting a new record. Moreover, 
supplementary pay for over-time, odd-hours and so on virtually disap-
peared overnight, depressing wage development even further. Real wag-
es consequently suffered and did not become positive again – albeit very 
modestly – in the private sector until the fi rst quarter of 2013. Wage 
competitiveness has increased relative to pre-crisis levels with employ-
ers and workers using wage fl exibility inherent in collective agreements. 
Some industries have been under such strain from job losses and cost 
competition that minimum wage levels in collective agreements have 
come under pressure. For example, the management of Danish Crown 
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(meat processing) argued that competition from German labour costs 
will force the company to relocate production if wages are not cut dras-
tically (see also below). Other companies, such as in retail, have also 
questioned the minimum wage levels due to the crisis in private con-
sumption. It remains to be seen whether the call for opt-out clauses is 
a passing phenomenon linked to the business cycle or an enduring phe-
nomenon due to structural problems in some industries. 
The inﬂ uence of German wage policies in Denmark
Denmark has a long and deep rooted history of German infl uence on 
Danish economic and political life. This is fi rst of all a consequence of 
Denmark being a small open economy neighbouring the much larger 
German economy. Looking at recent decades Germany has been the 
most important trading partner for Denmark. Further, many Danish 
manufacturing companies have been and still are operating as subcon-
tractors for German corporations. The bottom line is that the state of the 
German economy will always have an impact on the Danish economy. 
Attention towards fl uctuations in the German economy is therefore in-
herent in Danish economic decision-making; both at company and na-
tional level.
This includes attention towards processes of collective bargaining in 
Germany and wage trends in general. Not least due to fact that since 
the 1980s the Danish Krone has been pegged fi rst to the D Mark, and 
later the Euro, the awareness of Danish policy makers, including rep-
resentatives of employers’ associations and trade unions towards Ger-
man wage developments has deepened. The fi xed exchange rate policy 
has created a strong transparency on Danish wage trends versus Ger-
man trends which in turn gives immediate indications whether wage in-
creases hamper companies competitiveness or not. In more recent years 
we also know that the Danish metalworking trade union, Dansk Metal, 
has intensifi ed contacts to their German colleagues in the Baltic Sea re-
gion, IG Metall Bezirk Küste, in order to be able to follow trends and 
developments in Germany (Andersen 2006). Similar contacts exist for 
the employers. 
Next to this long known interest in and dependence of wage trends in 
Germany the German success on job creation since the outbreak of the 
fi nancial crisis has paved the way for an even stronger focus on job crea-
tion and wage trends in Germany in the Danish debate. Especially repre-
sentatives of the dominant employers’ associations are emphasising that 
the competitiveness of Danish exporting industries has been weakened 
not least due to relatively high wage increases from around year 2000 
and until the crisis emerged. Often Germany has been the point of refer-
ence in this debate. Real wages in manufacturing increased quite con-
siderably in Danish manufacturing compared to Germany from 1998 to 
2010. Since then real wages in Danish manufacturing has by and large 
stabilised.
Dominant trade unions did recognise that wage increases in the years 
leading up to the fi nancial crisis were ’unbalanced’. Still in the subse-
quent years think tanks linked to the trade union movement have pro-
duced a number of reports and policy papers responding to the diagno-
sis of staggering wages and lost competitiveness as causes of failing job 
growth. In a report entitled Danes will not be richer following the Ger-
man path the Economic Council of the Labour Movement argues that 
one important difference between the two countries is that Denmark was 
faced with a housing-bubble leading to a drop in house prices, declining 
fortunes and shrinking private consumption. The Council argues that 
the Danish labour market is healthy and well-functioning and warns 
against some German trends i.e. what is termed a polarisation as wage 
developments for some groups like private services are lagging behind 
manufacturing (AE 2014). 
The centre-left think tank Cevea presents an identical critical perspec-
tive on the development on the German labour market and thereby also 
warns against adopting lessons from Germany. Growing wage inequality 
is once again a core theme in this publication (Cevea 2013). 
Specifi c challenges arise from the quite signifi cant differences in wage-
levels between low wage groups in Germany and Denmark. Germany has 
from January 2015 introduced a statutory minimum wage at 8.50 € per 
hour. The minimum wage stipulated in the Danish collective agreements 
is around 15 € per hour for unskilled jobs. This wide gap in minimum 
wage levels between the two countries is to some degree explained by 
different social systems; employers’ social contributions in Germany 
versus a universal social system fi nanced via personal taxes in Denmark. 
Nevertheless, this makes low skilled jobs attractive for some Germans 
as well as other groups of foreign workers. This causes worries in trade 
unions as foreign workers might accept working at minimum wages in 
jobs where native workers typically are paid above minimum wage lev-
els. This has often been framed as ‘wage dumping’ by the trade unions. 
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Another effect of the substantial wage gap between the two countries is 
the outsourcing of jobs to Germany. 
Probably the most prominent example is the slaughter houses. Danish 
Crown is a multinational company accounting for around two-thirds of 
jobs in slaughter houses. Since 2003 Danish Crown has been both cen-
tralising and relocating. Some 20 sites have been closed and jobs have 
been sourced both to larger sites in Denmark and abroad – especially to 
Germany. Approximately 2,000 jobs have been relocated to sites outside 
Denmark (Refslund 2012). One of the main reasons for relocating jobs 
in Germany is that slaughter house workers typically earn 8–12 euros 
per hour there, whereas Danish workers earn 24–27 euros, according 
to Danish Crown. Typically, the German sites employ sub-contracted 
eastern European workers who are exempt from non-wage social con-
tributions and collectively agreed wage rates as they are posted workers 
employed by, for example,  eastern European agencies. 
Summing up, it can be argued the infl uence of German wage policies and 
trends are both quite direct due to the small and open Danish economy’s 
dependence of the German markets and has especially in recent years 
had a strong effect at a more discursive level due to the apparent success 
of the German economy; meaning how to interpret and understand the 
relatively poor Danish economic performance and what are the neces-
sary policy initiatives in order to bring back growth, jobs and increase in 
real wages for all groups in the labour market.
4.2 Finland: the inﬂ uence of German wage policy is apparent
As a full member of EMU, Finland is in a special position among the 
Nordic countries. In the absence of a sovereign currency, it is impossible 
to use exchange rate policy as a means of affecting price competitiveness. 
Consequently, the importance of domestic wage policy increases, as does 
that of wage policies in neighbouring competing countries. As Germa-
ny traditionally has been an important trading partner for Finland, its 
economic importance as the core country of the EMU has made it even 
more important. Therefore wage trends in Germany have been moni-
tored closely especially since entering the euro zone, and German wage 
policy has been an important topic in Finnish discussions on wages and 
costs. Not only German wage developments but also the German collec-
tive bargaining system has been part of the debate. The most important 
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driver behind these debates has been the employers in the Confederation 
of Finnish Industries (EK). 
Employers’ representatives have maintained that, because of too costly 
collective agreements, the Finnish exports industry has lost its price 
competitiveness. In its statements, EK has emphasised that, in particu-
lar, a drastic deterioration of price competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany 
has taken place. Regarding the bargaining system representatives of 
employer’s confederation have proposed that Finland should learn from 
German experiences. Meaning that wage bargaining should be decen-
tralised in Finland, for example, via expanding the possibility to use vari-
ous kinds of derogation clauses. Currently options to deviate from pay 
norms set by collective agreements are substantially more limited in Fin-
land than in Germany. Obviously Finland provides an interesting case as 
developments since entering the euro illustrates how, within a monetary 
union, not only wage policies but also systems of wage bargaining are 
interconnected. In what follows, we give a more detailed comparison be-
tween Finland and Germany.
Figure 1 summarises some similarities and differences in wage trends 
within manufacturing in Finland and Germany during 2001–2013. Evi-
dently there is a strong similarity in collectively agreed wages during the 
period. Annual changes may have differed a little, but in both countries 
collectively agreed wages increased by 30 per cent from 2000 to 2011. 
There is, however, a noticeable difference between changes in average 
actual wages during the period from 2000 until 2011. In Finland aver-
age actual wages increased faster than collectively agreed wages, while in 
Germany they increased less than collectively agreed wages. This means 
that German wage drift – that is, the difference between the increase in 
actual and collectively agreed pay – has been negative, while it has been 
positive in the Finnish case. 
Even though the difference between increases in actual wages in Finnish 
and German manufacturing is obvious, it needs to be emphasised that 
the difference is not due to the conclusion of too costly agreements in 
spite of what some employers’ representatives often state. 
The discrepancy is due to the difference between the collective bargain-
ing systems in the two countries. In Finland, collectively agreed pay 
increases normally set a minimum for actual pay increases, while in Ger-
many this is not the case. An important explanation for negative wage 
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drift has been the use of opening clauses see, for example (Bispinck and 
Schulten 2011; Schulten and Bispinck 2014). As employers may benefi t 
from the use of opening clauses, it has not come as a big surprise that 
employers in EK are interested in having at least a partial reconstruction 
of the Finnish collective bargaining system. 
Despite higher wage increases in the Finnish manufacturing industry, 
there have not been any signifi cant differences in unit labour cost de-
velopments compared to Germany. Labour productivity growth has 
compensated for higher labour cost increases. According to unit labour 
cost developments in manufacturing, the Finnish exports industry 
has not experienced any dramatic loss of competitiveness. However, 
if one looks at unit labour cost developments in the entire economy, a 
clear discrepancy has developed between Finland and Germany. During 
2001-2012, price competitiveness has deteriorated by some twenty per 
cent. The above mentioned CSRs delivered by the Commission are based 
on the use of unit labour costs in the whole economy as the relevant 
indicator for price competitiveness. In the Finnish debate, employers’ 
representatives have systematically used developments of this indicator 
Figure 1 Developments of average wages and collectively agreed wages in 
Finland and in Germany 2001–2013, manufacturing (%) 
Source: TURI database on collectively agreed wages, Destatis, Statistics Finland.
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as the proof that the Finnish competitiveness has decreased signifi cantly 
vis-à-vis Germany. 
Some noteworthy conclusions can be drawn from the comparison be-
tween Finland and Germany. Within a monetary union, differences in 
wage bargaining systems may give rise to notable differences in actual 
wages even if increases in collectively agreed pay have been similar, and 
consequently, to corresponding differences in unit labour costs. This 
means that the coordination of wage policies, or wage claims between 
trade unions located in various countries, may be extremely diffi cult if 
wage bargaining systems differ among these countries. 
The current situation in Finland supports the view that the basic prereq-
uisite for the strengthening of labour unions’ attempts towards Europe-
an-level coordination of collective bargaining is the maintenance of the 
strengths of multi-employer bargaining systems. On the other hand, it is 
not surprising that currently one of the employer’s organisation, EK’s, 
main objectives is to ‘import German elements’ into the Finnish collec-
tive bargaining system. 
4.3  Norway: Benchmarking of trading partners in a petroleum 
driven economy 
The European economic integration has had less effect in Norway, as 
there is no currency binding to the Euro and as Norway is not part of 
the economic coordination. However, this does not mean that Norway is 
unaffected by the EU development in this fi eld. As mentioned earlier in-
ternational export markets play an important role in the trend setting 
bargaining model. The competiveness of the Norwegian export indus-
tries, or terms of trade, is measured by the tripartite committee Tech-
nical Calculation Committee (TBU), with representatives from all the 
major social partners. The TBU committee has developed an indicator 
based on the Norwegian wage level or the Norwegian labour costs com-
pared to an average wage costs among the most important trading part-
ners. These ratios are measured in common currency (see Figure 2). In 
this context Germany is playing an important role as topping the list of 
the most important trading partners in 2011 to 2013 followed by Sweden 
and Great Britain (NOU 2014: 3). However, a number of other countries 
are included in this indicator as well. The terms of trade, included the 
future prospects of the Norwegian economy, are discussed in the annual 
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reports presented by the TBU committee. The committee does not give 
any recommendation for the coming wage settlement, but is rather con-
tributing to a common understanding of the economic situation which 
is seen as an imperative factor for the opening negotiations in the export 
sectors as well as for coordination across industries and sectors. 
The wage setting model has been under pressure on a number of occa-
sions, among others as a result of high wage settlements or high wage 
drift compared to trading partners. Such periods have often been fol-
lowed by moderate settlements and stronger coordination, often sup-
ported by strengthened tripartite cooperation. In addition the Norwe-
gian dependence on petroleum exports, and thereby the importance of 
the petroleum related industry, means that the Norwegian economy may 
develop otherwise than the neighbouring countries. In 2013 the tripar-
tite Holden Committee which included social partners together with eco-
nomic experts discussed whether the trendsetting industries model had 
to be reconsidered, due to the way the labour market has been affected 
by changes in the Norwegian as well as the international economy. In 
the period 2010–2012 the Norwegian manufacturing sector lost out in 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Relative hourly wage costs (national currency) Relative hourly wage costs (common currency)
Figure 2 Developments of relatively hourly wage costs in Norway compared 
with average wage costs among trade partners  
Note: Changes from the previous year. Employees in the manufacturing/industry sector.
Source: Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements (TBU).
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terms of trade, and representatives from both sides in industry called for 
moderation in wages and costs in order to save jobs. Among the ques-
tions asked by the Holden Committee, was whether the wage bargaining 
model is able to handle a situation with high demand in the petroleum 
sector combined with an international market in recession for the more 
traditional export industries. Major parts of the metal industry – which 
always are part of the trend-setting industries collective agreement – are 
suppliers to the petroleum industry and thereby strongly infl uenced by 
the oil price (which might be high even in a period of international cri-
ses). However, the committee did not propose any changes of the trend 
setting industries model such as removing suppliers to the petroleum 
industry from the relevant collective agreement. The recommendation 
from the committee was to strengthen voluntary coordination measures, 
and pointed to the fact that Norway will face lower income form the pe-
troleum sector due to decreasing oil revenues as well as more variable oil 
prices over time.
In major parts of the private sector company level bargaining on average 
make up more than 50 percent of the annual wage increases. As in the 
other Nordic countries, company bargaining takes place under a peace 
duty clause and under the framework of the central level agreements. 
The parties have agreed that company level bargaining should be guided 
by the profi tability, productivity, future prospects and competitiveness 
of the company (‘the four criteria’ from 1990s) although the compliance 
of this principle is based on a common understanding without any in-
struments for enforcement. The unions for white collar workers never 
had the strength and high density rates as seen in Denmark and Sweden, 
and in the private sector wage setting for white collar workers is mainly 
decentralised and to a large degree based on individual criteria. 
Although the employer side argues in favour of less detailed regulations 
at central level, multi-employer bargaining and the sector-wide agree-
ments have not been challenged by the employer side. Opening-clauses 
or opt-outs from collective agreements have not had any major impact. 
In the 2009 bargaining round, when many companies experienced eco-
nomic insecurity as a result of the fi nancial crises, the trendsetting in-
dustries decided that the general wage increases awarded at central level 
could be postponed or ignored in situations where company fi nances 
were poor. However, this did not open up for local partners to reduce 
wages below the minimum rates in the collective agreement for the in-
dustry and the option was hardly used. Still, in a long-time perspective 
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the trend setting industries model and its strong reliance on coordina-
tion might be challenged by the weakened capacity to regulate wages 
in low-pay sectors as well as by groups who no longer see an interest in 
submitting to the normative framework set by a deceasing number of 
traditional blue-collar workers and their employers. 
5. Discussion: The future of Nordic wage bargaining
The export-oriented industries – especially manufacturing – have been 
the driving force behind changes in the collective bargaining systems in 
the Nordic countries in the late 1980s and up through the 1990s. In-
creased international competition and new production methods in the 
1980s was the motivation for employers calling for changes. As we have 
seen, the collective bargaining systems are intact, but changed. Across 
the Nordic countries, the industrial structure is varied and different 
types of industry dominate in the individual countries. Overall, however, 
manufacturing companies and their exports have maintained an impor-
tant role for the national economies. 
As we have shown, institutional changes in the collective bargaining sys-
tems did not happen in a uniform way, but had varying paces and con-
sequences in the Nordic states. In spite of the differences we fi nd in all 
these bargaining systems decentralised bargaining within a coordinated 
framework. In other words national collective agreements concluded at 
sector level is setting the framework for company level negotiations. Tak-
ing into account the overall economic performance of the Nordic states 
we argued that competitiveness was enhanced via collective bargaining 
based on the relatively pragmatic positions of dominant trade unions 
and employers’ associations. As emphasised this does not mean that 
confl icts and power struggles have been absent, rather that we have seen 
a basic willingness to try to develop the collective bargaining systems. 
This overall trend fi rst and foremost cover the period between the crisis 
of the 1980s and the very early 1990s and the fi nancial crisis. Hereby 
said that over recent years – and accelerated by the fi nancial crisis – new 
challenges have become apparent. Manufacturing industries have expe-
rienced an accelerating internationalisation in recent decades, which in 
turn has increased the competition for the remaining workplaces and 
led to debates as to whether parts of the Nordic manufacturing industry 
are close to hitting the critical levels for what is required to maintain 
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the national preconditions for innovation and competence development 
that are essential for job creation in manufacturing. Many jobs were for 
instance lost in Danish manufacturing in the early years of the fi nan-
cial crisis. In most recent years employment in Danish manufacturing 
has increased, however, with relatively modest fi gures. The question is 
whether we in the years to come will see a substantial increase in innova-
tion, production and job-creation or not. 
After underlining the importance of the reform of the collective bargain-
ing systems in the Nordic states we turned to the question of the po-
tential impact of the new economic governance regime of the European 
Union on the Nordic collective bargaining systems. We concluded that 
the direct effect of these policy initiatives have been limited. Few and 
rather insignifi cant recommendations have been forwarded to the Nor-
dic states regarding the development in wages and income. On the other 
hand, we raised the question of indirect effects, such as the potential 
German wage leadership. The basic argument was that the small and 
open Nordic economies are very interwoven with and therefore depend-
ent of the much larger German economy. The discussion of how German 
wage trends have infl uenced national debates on wages and costs seems 
to suggest that in recent years there we have seen a rather substantial in-
fl uence of German wage trends in Finland and Denmark on the national 
debates on the potential room for wages increase – or even the institu-
tional set-up of the bargaining system (the Finnish case), while this is 
less so in Norway. The reason for Norway to a larger degree bypassing 
the German ‘wage-leadership’ might be Norwegian dependence of petrol 
industry which therefore also infl uence economic dynamics and priori-
ties. With regard to Finland and Denmark it appears to be evident that 
the German economic success in recent years has made the discourse of 
German wage leadership stronger whereas in the pre-crisis years Nordic 
wage increases clearly exceeded German trends. 
Furthermore, we raised the question how European integration in other 
ways infl uence wage developments in the Nordic countries. In recent 
years there has been a quite heated debate on social dumping, especially 
voiced by the trade unions. Moreover, since EU’s enlargement into east-
ern and central Europe, companies in some sectors, typically construc-
tion, shipbuilding, the food industry, slaughterhouses, agriculture and 
horticulture, are exploiting the free movement of labour and services to 
use cheaper subcontractors and temporary employment agencies. Some 
businesses are also employing cheaper workers from abroad in their do-
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mestic manufacturing. There are employers who argue that this is nec-
essary to compensate for the high Nordic labour costs in order to avoid 
increased outsourcing or simply closing the activity in the host country, 
which they claim to be the alternative. This is a major dilemma for the 
employer organisations, where the large companies can exploit the ad-
vantages of free mobility, while many of the members from smaller com-
panies are often left with a diffi cult struggle merely to survive (Alfonso 
2012).
The market integration and internationalisation have also progressed 
rapidly in the transport industry, where the large international logistics 
and transport companies place trucks and drivers in complicated sys-
tems using the various wage and costs levels in the respective European 
countries in order to maximise their returns (Dølvik et al. 2003; Jensen 
et al. 2014). As with manufacturing and construction, road transport is a 
part of the internal market, but there are still rules for how many trips a 
foreign truck or bus may run in another EU country with national goods 
or passengers – the so-called cabotage rules. Nevertheless, internation-
al road transport in and out of the Nordic countries has largely been 
taken over by foreign drivers, often from eastern and central Europe, 
and in the domestic road transport there is a recurring debate about how 
diffi cult it is to control cabotage rules and the increased low-wage com-
petition.
The opening of markets has thus intensifi ed price competition between 
companies and the struggle for earnings and jobs in large parts of the 
domestic-oriented sectors. In this manner, the broader market integra-
tion puts the collective bargaining systems in the affected sectors under 
pressure. In addition to transport and construction, there is reason to as-
sume that especially the labour-intensive private service sectors, such as 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants as well as cleaning will be particularly 
vulnerable, as the development in productivity and added value is more 
modest than in manufacturing, unionisation is much weaker and the hir-
ing of foreign labour is increasing. In the longer term, such trends may 
undermine the basis for the close coordination of agreements and wage 
formation across industries in the Nordic countries and provide the ba-
sis for increased differentiation of wages between and within branches in 
line with what has been seen most clearly in Germany in recent decades.
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